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MISINFORMED CONSENT: UPHOLDING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SOUTH 
DAKOTA’S SUICIDE ADVISORY IN PLANNED 
PARENTHOOD MINNESOTA, NORTH DAKOTA, 
SOUTH DAKOTA v. ROUNDS 
Cailin Harris* 
Abstract: On July 24, 2012, in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Dakota v. Rounds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, considered the constitutionality of a suicide advisory por-
tion of a South Dakota statute that required informed consent for abor-
tions. The Eight Circuit found the advisory was constitutional because the 
information disclosures required by the statute were truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion. 
The court relied in part on the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision Gonzales v. 
Carhart, which held that Congress has the authority to legislate in the 
abortion context, even in areas of medical uncertainty. The Eighth Cir-
cuit, however, misapplied the reasoning of Gonzales and dangerously 
minimized the standard for scientific evidence in informed consent laws. 
Introduction 
 Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Da-
kota, and its medical director (Planned Parenthood) sued the state of 
South Dakota to prevent a 2005 statute amending the state’s require-
ments for obtaining informed consent to an abortion from taking ef-
fect.1 The statute required physicians to provide certain information to 
patients, including a written statement telling the pregnant woman that 
undergoing an abortion would subject her to an “[i]ncreased risk of 
suicide ideation and suicide” (“the suicide advisory”).2 Planned Parent-
hood argued that the suicide advisory requires physicians to disclose to 
patients an untrue and misleading causal link between abortion and 
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1 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds V ), 686 F.3d 889, 892 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’g 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D. 2009). 
2 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds I ), 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 
884 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008), remanded to 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 
(D.S.D. 2009). 
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suicide.3 Planned Parenthood contended that this requirement im-
poses an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion and violates 
the free speech rights of physicians.4 
 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit up-
held the constitutionality of the suicide advisory.5 The Eighth Circuit 
relied in part on the reasoning in the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision 
Gonzales v. Carhart, which held that Congress had the authority to enact 
a law banning certain abortion procedures, despite medical uncertainty 
over whether the law would impose significant health risks on women.6 
Citing this reasoning, the Eight Circuit found that the South Dakota 
legislature had the authority to require the disclosure of increased risk 
of suicide, regardless of “‘medical and scientific uncertainty’” as to 
whether abortion causes suicide.7 
I. South Dakota’s Informed Consent Statute and Planned 
Parenthood’s Lawsuit 
 In 1993, South Dakota enacted a law requiring physicians to obtain 
voluntary and informed consent from all patients seeking abortions, 
except in medical emergencies.8 The informed consent provision re-
quires physicians to disclose to the patient “the medical risks associated 
with abortion and with carrying [the] child to term . . . .”9 In 2005, the 
State enacted House Bill 1166 (“the Act”), which amended the 1993 
statute.10 The Act expanded the disclosure requirements that doctors 
must provide to patients when obtaining informed consent to an abor-
tion.11 The new disclosure provisions required doctors to explain the 
biological effects of an abortion “on a whole, separate . . . living human 
being” and to give “[a] description of all known medical risks of the 
procedure and statistically significant risk factors to which [the woman] 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 894; Rounds I, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 885. 
4 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 892. 
5 See id. at 906. 
6 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164 (2007); Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy, 
J., dissenting). 
7 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 900 (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164). 
8 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II ), 467 F.3d 716, 719 (8th 
Cir. 2006). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. (citing S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1 (2011)). 
11 Id. 
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would be subjected, including . . . [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation 
and suicide . . . .”12 
 In June of 2005, Planned Parenthood and its medical director, Dr. 
Carol E. Ball, sued South Dakota to prevent the Act from taking effect, 
claiming that portions of the Act were unconstitutionally vague.13 Addi-
tionally, Planned Parenthood argued that several provisions of the Act, 
including the suicide advisory, constituted an undue burden on abor-
tion rights and violated patients’ and physicians’ free speech rights.14 In 
response, South Dakota contended that the Act protects the due proc-
ess liberty interests of women seeking abortions and ensures that these 
patients “fully appreciate[] the nature of the procedure and all of its 
risks to both herself and her child.”15 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota prelimi-
narily enjoined the Act on June 30, 2005, finding that the Act likely vio-
lated abortion providers’ free speech rights.16 In the district court’s 
view, portions of the Act comprised unconstitutional compelled speech 
as they required doctors to express the state’s views as if they were their 
own opinion.17 Initially, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision.18 After revisiting the case en banc, however, 
the Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.19 
 On remand, the district court found that portions of the Act were 
constitutional.20 Nevertheless, the district court granted a permanent 
injunction and barred enforcement of the suicide advisory, finding that 
it required physicians to make untrue and misleading statements to 
                                                                                                                      
12 S.D. Codified Laws § 34–23A-10.1; Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. 
Rounds (Rounds IV ), 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976 (D.S.D. 2009), rev’d 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 
2012) (explaining that the “biological disclosure” portion of the statute requires the physi-
cian to make a statement that “‘the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being’”). 
13 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds V ), 686 F.3d 889, 892 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’g 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D. 2009). 
14 Id. 
15 See Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, Planned Parenthood 
Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds I), 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.S.D. 2005) (No. 05–4077), 
2005 WL 1792244. 
16 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 892; Rounds I, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 887–88. 
17 See Rounds I, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
18 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 892. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. at 892–93; Rounds IV, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 980–81, 987–88 (holding that the bio-
logical disclosure requirement and the medical emergency exception were constitutional 
and that the statutory phrase “all known medical risks” was not unconstitutionally vague). 
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patients.21 The court concluded that this provision imposed an undue 
burden on abortion rights and facially violated doctors’ right under the 
First Amendment not to be compelled to speak by the government.22 
On appeal, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision regarding the suicide advisory, but later granted a re-
hearing en banc only on the issue of this particular provision.23 
 The en banc court vacated the permanent injunction against the 
enforcement of the suicide advisory provision of the Act.24 The en banc 
majority held that the suicide advisory neither imposed an undue bur-
den on abortion rights nor violated physicians’ free speech rights, rely-
ing in part on Gonzales v. Carhart.25 In 2007, in Gonzales, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress has the authority to enact a law that bans an 
abortion procedure, despite medical uncertainty regarding the proce-
dure’s necessity.26 The majority’s reliance on Gonzales however, danger-
ously diminishes the amount and scientific quality of information that 
women in South Dakota will receive after they consent to an abortion.27 
II. The Eighth Circuit Vacates the Permanent Injunction 
Against the Suicide Advisory Under the Casey Standard 
 Planned Parenthood contended that forcing doctors to tell their 
patients about the purported suicide risk imposed an undue burden on 
abortion rights and violated physicians’ free speech rights.28 As the 
Eighth Circuit explained, the standard for the constitutionality of in-
formed consent disclosures in the abortion context was set out in the 
Supreme Court’s 1992 decision Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey.29 
 In Casey, the Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania informed 
consent law was not an undue burden on a woman’s right to have ac-
cess to abortion.30 The Court explained that the undue burden stan-
                                                                                                                      
21 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 906; Rounds IV, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 983. 
22 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 892. 
23 Id. at 893. 
24 Id. at 906. 
25 Id. at 900; id. at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
26 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146–47, 164 (2007); Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). 
27 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
28 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds V ), 686 F.3d 889, 892 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’g 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D. 2009). 
29 See id. at 893 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 
(1992)). 
30 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887. 
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dard should be employed in order to protect the right to abortion ac-
cess that was recognized by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, while 
also protecting a state’s profound interest in potential life.31 An undue 
burden exists, and a provision of law is therefore invalid, if the purpose 
or effect of the law is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a 
woman’s choice to obtain an abortion.32 Although a state is permitted 
to “enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking 
an abortion,” it may not impose unnecessary health regulations that 
present a substantial obstacle.33 The Court further annunciated that the 
government does not impose an undue burden on abortion rights 
when it requires “the giving of truthful, non-misleading information 
about the nature of the abortion procedure, the attendant health risks 
and those of childbirth . . . .”34 
A. Disparate Results in Applying the Casey Standard to the Suicide Advisory 
 To prevail under the standard set forth in Casey, the Eight Circuit 
en banc majority in Rounds V explained that Planned Parenthood was 
required to show that the information required by the suicide advisory 
was untrue, misleading, or irrelevant to a patient’s decision to abort her 
pregnancy.35 Analyzing the suicide advisory using the Casey standard, 
the en banc majority found it was constitutional.36 The majority first 
examined what disclosure the Act requires doctors to convey to patients 
seeking abortions.37 Planned Parenthood argued that the disclosures 
referred to a causal link between abortion and suicide.38 According to 
Planned Parenthood, the suicide advisory provision required physicians 
to tell their patients that it is “generally recognized” that undergoing an 
abortion causes an increased risk of suicide.39 
                                                                                                                      
31 Id. at 878. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. at 838. 
35 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 893. 
36 See id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 894. 
39 Id. at 889; Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross–Appellants at 51–52, Planned Parent-
hood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds V ), 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012), 2010 WL 
1535951 [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross–Appellants]. Planned Parent-
hood highlighted the Act’s requirement that physicians disclose that an increased risk of 
suicide is a risk factor “to which the pregnant woman would be subjected.” Brief of Plain-
tiffs/Appellees/Cross–Appellants, supra, at 889. 
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 The majority, however, rejected this argument, instead interpreting 
the advisory to require a disclosure of an increased risk of suicide, 
rather than a causal link between suicide and abortion.40 Additionally, 
the majority stated that the finding of an increased risk of suicide did 
not require conclusive proof of a causal link between abortion and sui-
cide.41 
 The majority then discussed whether the disclosure of an in-
creased risk of suicide is truthful.42 The court found that numerous 
studies published in peer-reviewed medical journals supported South 
Dakota’s contention that women who abort their pregnancies have a 
higher risk of suicide than women who have not had abortions.43 Such 
studies, the majority explained, were “sufficiently reliable to support 
the truth of the proposition that the relative risk of suicide and suicide 
ideation is higher for women who abort their pregnancies compared to 
women who give birth or have not become pregnant.”44 Therefore, the 
court concluded that the disclosure required by the Act was truthful.45 
 Finally, the court asked whether the disclosure of an increased risk 
of suicide associated with abortions was misleading or irrelevant.46 
Planned Parenthood presented evidence that the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, two leading professional medical associations, and every 
provider of elective abortions in the country do not adopt the view that 
abortion increases the risk of suicide.47 Additionally, Planned Parent-
hood presented evidence indicating that suicide may be caused by fac-
tors preexisting the abortion procedure, such as a history of mental 
illness, domestic violence, and young age at the time of pregnancy.48 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 898 (explaining that the advisory requires physicians to dis-
close “simply that the risk of suicide and suicide ideation is higher among women who 
abort compared to women in other relevant groups, such as women who give birth or do 
not become pregnant”). 
41 See id. at 895. 
42 Id. at 893. 
43 Id. at 894–95, 898–99 (citing Mika Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 
1987–94, 313 Brit. Med. J. 1431, 1432 (1996) (finding an “increased risk of suicide” in 
women who had received an induced abortion); David M. Fergusson, et al., Abortion in 
Young Women and Subsequent Mental Health, 47 J. Child Psychol. & Psychiatry 16, 19 
(2006) (concluding that the women in the study “who had abortions appeared to be at 
moderately increased risk of both concurrent and subsequent mental health problems when 
compared with equivalent groups of pregnant or non-pregnant peers.”)). 
44 Id. at 898–99. 
45 Id. at 899. 
46 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 893. 
47 Id. at 908–09 (Murphy, J., dissenting); Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross–Appellants, 
supra note 39, at 54. 
48 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 899; id. at 907–08 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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These factors may predispose women to have both unwanted pregnan-
cies and suicidal tendencies, creating misleading correlations between 
suicide and abortion.49 Planned Parenthood argued the suicide advi-
sory was therefore misleading and irrelevant to patients seeking abor-
tions.50 
 The en banc majority, however, did not interpret Planned Parent-
hood’s evidence as definitive proof of absence of a causal link between 
abortion and suicide.51 Instead, the court viewed the evidence as a 
mere admission of medical and scientific uncertainty surrounding the 
abortion procedure.52 The Eight Circuit however, found that medical 
and scientific uncertainty was not sufficient to establish that the suicide 
advisory was unconstitutionally misleading or irrelevant.53 In coming to 
this conclusion, the en banc majority relied significantly on the Su-
preme Court’s 2007 decision Gonzales v. Carhart.54 
B. Medical Uncertainty of the Suicide Advisory and  
the Majority’s Reliance on Gonzales 
 Gonzales v. Carhart involved two consolidated cases in which 
Planned Parenthood and a group of doctors who perform second tri-
mester abortions separately sued the U.S. Attorney General to enjoin 
the enforcement of the Partial–Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“the 
Ban”).55 The Ban was a federal statute that proscribed a type of abor-
tion procedure typically performed in the second trimester of a 
woman’s pregnancy.56 The evidence presented showed that there was 
documented medical disagreement over whether the Ban’s prohibi-
tions would impose significant health risks on women who required 
second trimester abortions for health reasons.57 Despite this uncer-
tainty, the Gonzales Court held that there was a sufficient basis to con-
clude that the Ban did not impose an undue burden on abortion rights 
because state and federal legislatures have “wide discretion to pass legis-
lation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”58 
                                                                                                                      
49 Id. at 899 (majority opinion). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 904. 
52 Id. at 900. 
53 See id. 
54 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
55 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007). 
56 See id. at 135–136. 
57 See id. at 162. 
58 Id. at 163–64. 
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 The Rounds majority relied on the Court’s reasoning in Gonzales to 
dispute many of Planned Parenthood’s arguments that the information 
in the suicide advisory was misleading and untruthful.59 Planned Par-
enthood presented the court with evidence that there was no causal 
link between abortion and suicide and that there are underlying factors 
that may predispose some women to have both unwanted pregnancies 
and suicidal tendencies.60 The Rounds majority viewed this evidence as 
an indication that there is “medical uncertainty” surrounding the in-
formation in the suicide advisory, and according to Gonzales, that is a 
sufficient basis for the exercise of legislative power.61 The court ex-
plained that the state legislature could best weigh these differing results 
and come to their own conclusion about how to legislate, without the 
court’s interference.62 As a result, the en banc majority held that the 
information in the suicide advisory did not impose an undue burden 
on abortion rights.63 
C. A Strong Dissent to the Majority’s Reasoning 
 In response, the dissent in Rounds V strongly disputed the major-
ity’s claims that the suicide advisory was constitutional under the Casey 
standard.64 It argued that the suicide advisory was unconstitutional be-
cause it did not inform the free choice of women and it was not consis-
tent with existing medical evidence.65 Whereas the majority found that 
the statute did not require the disclosure of a causal link between abor-
tion and suicide, the dissent asserted that the statute plainly required 
physicians to disclose a causal relationship.66 The dissent also argued 
that the evidence in the record, which the majority had characterized 
merely as divergent, clearly demonstrated that suicide is not a medical 
risk of abortion and is instead caused by preexisting factors.67 As the 
dissent explained, the majority had to overcome the clear evidence in 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
60 See id. at 899 (majority opinion); id. at 907–08 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. at 904–06 (majority opinion). 
62 See id. 
63 Id. To establish that the advisory was misleading, Planned Parenthood would have 
had to prove with medical and scientific certainty that abortion played no causal role. Id. at 
900. 
64 See id. at 907 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
65 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 907 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 898 (majority opinion); id. at 907 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
67 See id. at 904 (majority opinion); id. at 907 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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Planned Parenthood’s favor by relying on Gonzales to create a new stan-
dard for informed consent advisories.68 
 In the dissent’s view, the evidence of medical uncertainty as to the 
connection between suicide and abortion undermined the constitu-
tionality of the suicide advisory.69 Such uncertainty, however, was not 
fatal to the majority’s reasoning because the majority created a new 
standard for informed consent advisories.70 As the dissent explained, 
under the majority’s new test, the advisory would be truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant as long as a causal link between abortion and 
suicide could be theoretically possible.71 Planned Parenthood instead 
faced a greater burden of having to prove the absence of a causal link 
with scientifically accepted certainty in order to prevail.72 
 The dissent argued that the majority misapplied Gonzales in its dis-
cussion of medical uncertainty.73 Because Gonzales did not deal with an 
informed consent issue, the Court there did not evaluate the informa-
tion given to an individual woman to ensure that her decision is “‘ma-
ture and informed.’”74 Instead, the dissent pointed out that the Gonzales 
Court focused on the information that was presented to Congress.75 
The Court found that the legislature was fully informed of the contra-
dicting medical opinions regarding the Act and could thus “balance the 
need to protect the state’s interests in the ‘ethics of the medical profes-
sion’ and ‘respect for dignity of human life’ against the uncertain risks 
to women’s health resulting from the ban.”76 The state’s interest in 
Rounds, however, differed from the state’s interests in Gonzales.77 The 
state’s interest in Rounds was to promote a “‘wise,’ ‘mature[,] and in-
formed’ decision by women considering an abortion.”78 In South Da-
kota, the law did not inform women seeking an abortion of medical 
evidence indicating that the information in the suicide advisory may 
not be true.79 In light of this defect, a woman’s ability to make a wise, 
                                                                                                                      
68 Id. at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
71 Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
72 See id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 883). 
75 See id. 
76 Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 166). 
77 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
78 See id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 833, 877). 
79 Id. at 911. 
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mature, and informed choice to undergo an abortion would be hin-
dered.80 
III. The Majority’s Inappropriate Reliance on Gonzales 
 The Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds majority misap-
plied Gonzales v. Carhart, thereby creating a new standard for judging 
the constitutional validity of informed consent advisories.81 The hold-
ing significantly weakens Casey’s requirement that such advisories be 
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the patient’s decision to have 
an abortion because the information in the disclosure is not supported 
by medical evidence.82 
 The Rounds majority relied on Gonzales in part to find that the 
South Dakota legislature was in a better position than the court to 
weigh the differing opinions on the validity of the suicide advisory.83 
The majority, however, failed to consider the stark differences between 
the federal statute in Gonzales and the South Dakota informed consent 
law.84 In Gonzales, the statute in question prohibited a specific abortion 
procedure due to its particularly gruesome nature.85 In contrast, the 
South Dakota informed consent law containing the suicide advisory, 
does not regulate a procedure, but rather dictates the information that 
is directly provided to a woman to ensure that her decision is mature 
and informed.86 Additionally, in Gonzales, Congress had passed the Par-
tial–Birth Abortion Ban after having been fully informed of the medical 
uncertainty surrounding the procedure’s necessity.87 Under the South 
Dakota informed consent law’s suicide advisory, however, women seek-
ing abortions will not be made aware of the existence of medical uncer-
tainty surrounding the association between abortion and suicide.88 In-
stead, women seeking abortions will be told that the procedure will 
subject them to an increased risk of suicide, without an explanation 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. 
81 See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds V), 686 F.3d 889, 911 
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Murphy, J., dissenting), rev’g 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D. 2009). 
82 See id. at 892 (majority opinion) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 882–83, 911(1992)); id. at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
83 See id. at 904, 906 (majority opinion); id. at 907 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
84 See id. at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
85 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146–47 (2007). 
86 See id.; Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds I ), 375 F. Supp. 2d 
881, 883–84 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008), remanded to 650 F. 
Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D. 2009). 
87 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
88 See id. 
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that the validity of such information is in dispute among members of 
the medical community.89 
 The majority also failed to consider an important factor that the 
Gonzales Court relied on in concluding that the Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban was constitutional.90 In Gonzales, the Court reasoned that the Par-
tial–Birth Abortion Ban was valid in part because there were alternative 
second trimester abortion procedures readily available that were not 
banned by the statute.91 The Rounds majority failed to adequately ad-
dress this issue, despite the fact that the Act requires that all women in 
South Dakota who seek abortions be given the information in the sui-
cide advisory.92 The fact that women must receive this information de-
spite medical uncertainty shows a sharp contrast between the suicide 
advisory at issue in Rounds and the federal statute upheld by Gonzales.93 
 As a result of the majority’s reliance on Gonzales, women in South 
Dakota who seek abortions will not have the benefit of receiving truth-
ful and non-misleading information about the procedure.94 The suicide 
advisory, therefore, represents “an undue burden on a pregnant 
woman’s due process rights and violates a doctor’s First Amendment 
right against compelled speech.”95 The majority explained that the goal 
“‘of informed consent laws is to allow the patient to evaluate her condi-
tion and render her best decision under difficult circumstances.’”96 By 
relying on Gonzales, the majority failed to meet these established goals 
of providing women with the most accurate information possible.97 In-
stead, the court validated a law that requires doctors to give women 
medical information that is at best only a partial explanation of the is-
sue, and at worst is untruthful, misleading, and irrelevant.98 
Conclusion 
 In validating the suicide advisory portion of South Dakota’s in-
formed consent to abortion law, the Eighth Circuit relied in part on 
Gonzales v. Carhart to find that the state’s legislature had the power to 
                                                                                                                      
89 See id. 
90 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164; Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 905. 
91 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164. 
92 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 905. 
93 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164; Rounds V, 686 F.3d at 905. 
94 See Rounds V, 686 F.3d. at 893; id. at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
95 See id. at 912 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
96 See id. at 905 (majority opinion) (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion 
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
97 See id. at 905; id. at 912 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
98 See id. at 912 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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implement the law, despite medical uncertainty surrounding the in-
formation in the advisory. Reliance on Gonzales was inappropriate in 
this case because women seeking abortions will not have the benefit of 
weighing the evidence regarding the association between abortions and 
suicide. As a result, women in South Dakota who seek abortions will be 
exposed to information that is potentially untruthful and misleading, 
and which therefore imposes an undue burden on their constitutional 
right to obtain an abortion. 
